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FIRST·SECTION'

FIRST DAY
VIRGINIP. 301',,IW OF BAR EX..7\H.INERS
Richmond, Virginia - Pebruary 25 1 1975

l.
Roger Benson is a building contractor in the City of
Suffolk who specializes in the construction of dwelling houses.
On May 1, 1974 Benson entered into a written contract with Thomas
Newcomb by uhich Benson agreed to construct for Newcomb in the
City of Suffolk a dwelling house for ,;; 40, 000. The contract provided. that the dwelling was to be constructed in accordance with
written plans and specifications made a part of the contract; and
further provided ,construction ~·rns to be completed and deli very
made on or before December 31, 1974. On December 30th, Benson
delivered the cor.1pleted dv1elling house over to Newcomb, and asked
the latter to make the final construction installment payment of
$8,000 one Neek later as required by the contract. Newcomb refused
to make the payment of $8,000 on the contract date, and told Bens9n
that he had no intention of making any further payments whatever.
Benson promptly brought an action against Newcomb in the Circuit
Court of the City of Suffolk asking damages of $8,000 for breach of
contract. · Shortly thereafter, iJewco1::b duly filed his grounds of
defense in which he denied breach of contract or anv indebtedness
to Benson. l\t the same time, Newcomb filed a counterclaim containing two counts. The first count of the counterclaim alleged that
the construction work performed by 3enson was defective and not in
accordance with certain designated plans and specifications; and
the count concluded with the averr,ient that Benson was liable to
Newcomb for $10,000 arising out cf a breach of the construction contract by Benson. The second count of the counterclaim alleged that
on December 16, 1974,:?>enson had carelessly driven his autor.:iobile
through a red light in the City of Suffolk, had thereby collided
with an automobile driven by Hel·,rcom~:: causing Newcomb to sustain serious
personal injuries; and the count concluded with the averment that
Benson was liable to Newcomb for $25,000 arising out of the injuries
sustained by Newcomb because of Benson's negligence. Benson has demurred to i'.Jewcomb vs counterclaim on the ground it is c1efecti ve by
reason of a misjoin<ler of causes of action.
How should· the Court rule on Benson's de~urrer?
2.
On October 13, 1974 Apex Printers, Inc. {Apex), which was
engaged in business in the City of Danville, employed Alfred Craft
as its General 'lanager. The employMent was made·pursuant to a valid
written contract executed by Apex and by Craft, and provided that
the employment was to be for a term of five years with-compensation
at the rate of $30,000 per year. On November 14, 1974, at a duly
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called raeeting of its Board of Jirectors, Apex fired Craft as
r:anaqer effective at the close of business on the same
day o On the -evening of Nover:iber l,Jth, Tom Swift the President
of Aoex told Craft of the action of the Board of Directors, but
refu~ed to tell Craft the reasons ~otivating the Doardo Shortly
thereafter, Craft brought an action against Apex in the Circuit
Court of the City of Danville seeking damages of $4.00,000 for
breach of contract and for injury to his reputation. On the
trial of the case, Craft introduced into evidence his contract
with Apex; teztified as to its breach1 and testified that his
discharg~ ha(J. Lecome generally known, and that, although he had
tried dili']ently, he coulc1. not find employment elsewhere. ~:e
then restell llis case. Swift, testifying for Apex~ confirmed that
Craft had been fired anr~ 1 on cross-exaI;1ination, stated that the
reason for the <lischarge of Craft was that a ~ajority of the
3oara consiuere:::;. craft \·.1holly incompetent to perform his duties
as General '.~anag<~r. A.fter th·~ jury Nas properly instructed, they
retired and thereafter returned. ivith a verdict of $400, 000 in
favor of Craft. :·711.en this verdict was announced, the jury was
excused and counsel for .l'l~'.)ex movec~. the Court to set aside the
verdict anc3. order a new trial on the ground that the jury's ver_dict ua.s excessive. Therupon, the Court said to counsel for l\.pex
and for Craft, "Gentlemen, I feel that the verdict of t:1e jury
is excessive and unsupported by the evidence o 'l'herefore, I put
I:lr. Craft on the follo\'!ing terns - either accept a judgn:.ent for
$150,000, rather than one for the $400,000 awarded by the jury,
or I will sustain the defendant's notion and order a new trial."
Counsel for Craft objected to the ruling of the Court asserting
as his grounds that the jury had been duly convened, had heard
all· the evidence and were the sole judges of the damages sustained
by Craft, that the Court \·ms Ni thout po~1er to change the verdict,
and could not usur;._:> the function of the jury in determining the
amount of damages to which Craft was entitled.
Ge~eral

Wae this objection well taken?

" 3•;, ~am B:::,~d-~:. 'i::?J~:; ~o'Ja r:b:;; a::e:e~~~ ~o::i

1

7
V<y
nitted in the City of Petersburg. At the trial of the case in
the Circuit Court of that City, the Commo.nwealth's Attorney
rested his case without having proy~n that- ~he r~ry was corr.mi ttectin Petersburg. Thereupon, counsel for Barnes moved-the
Court to strike the evidence of the Conmonwealth U::?On the ground
that venEe __ Jl.g.~~.--not.-.be.en .. proven. The Court overruled the !notion
and Barnes' counsel notea···fiTs e:>:ception. Counsel for Barnes then
called Joe Turner as a witness for Barnes, and upon 'I'urner' s crossexamination the Co:mmonwealth's Attorney showed that the robbery
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had occurred in the City of Petersburg. At the conclusion of all
the evidence in the case, cqunsel for Barnes renewed his motion
to strike the evidence of the Commonwealth. That motion was also
overruled and Barnes' counsel noted his exception. The jury 9 s
verdict found 3arnes guilty as charged, and fixed the punishment
at ten years in the penitentiary. The Court entered judgment
sentencing Barnes accordingly. '1 he Suprer.ie Court of Virginia
granted Barnes an appeal from the judgment. Barnes' counsel assigned to the Supreme Court as error the action of the Circuit
Court in overruling his original and renewed motions to strike
the evidenc·e of the Com.vuonwealth.
1

How should the Suprcr.1e Court rule on the

assignment 0£ error?

4.
Helen Stevens has brought an action against Ajax Bakery,
Inc. (Ajax}, a Virginia corporation, in the United States District
Court for the tvestern District of Virginia, Harrisonburg Division.
The complaint alleges thztt Ajax is engaged in an interstate bakery
business with its principal office in .the City of Harrisonburg;
that Helen Stevens answered an advertisement of Ajax by which she
sought employment as a truck driver at an annual salary of $7,000i
that Ajax refused to hire Helen f3tevens as a truck driver solely
on the ground she ·was a female saying that those positions were
only to be held by males~ that such denial of enployment was a
violation of the United States Civil Rights Act of 1964; that Helen
Stevens has taken all steps required by the Act before bringing the
action; and that such refusal to hire has caused Helen Stevens to
sustain damages of $7,000. Aja::-: has filed a r::totion- pursual'lt to
Rule 12(b) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure askini:J that the
action of Helen Stevens be dismissed on the grounds (a) that·no
diversity of citizenship has been all?ged or shown between the
plaintiff and the defendant, and (b) that the damages sought are
less than $10,000.
How should the Court rule on each ground for dismissal?
5.

Plaintiff and Defendant inherited a bluegrass farm of

1,000 acres consisting of 750 acres in :;;>u.laski County, Virginia,

and 250 acres in the adjoining County of ~-1ythe. Plaintiff instituted in the Circuit Court of Hythe County a chancery suit for
partition of this farm. Defendant filed an answer in which he
alleged that the suit could not be maintained in that court because the greater portion of the farm was located in Pulaski
County.

1t.:
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to

(a)

Did the answer assert a valid defense
the suit?

(b)

State the proper procedure, or procedures,
if there is more than one, by which plaintiff
may test the legal sufficiency of the answer.

6.
Andrew, falsely representing himself as being the Sales
f:.ianager of Brick, offered on Brick's behalf to sell and deliv~'.l:T
to Builder 5,000 brick at $70 per thousand. Builder accepted"the
offer. Without Brick 0 s knowledge, Andrew went to Brick's storage
yard and loaded 5,000 brick on his truck. While on his way to
deliver the brick to Builder, Andrew negligently injured Walker,
but nevertheless Andrew continued on and delivered the brick. In
connection with the investigation of the missing brick, Brick
learned the foregoing facts. Be demanded of Builder payment of
$70 per thousand for the 5,000 brick delivered, but Builder declined to pay. Thereupon, Drick ins.tituted a contract action
against Builder for the purchase price. Nhen Halker learned of
the action against Builder, he demanded damages from Brick for
his personal injuries. Brick now consults you as to his liability
for Walkergs injuries~
(a)

How ought you to advise him?

(b)

If, instead of having brought an action
in contract against Builder for the purchase price, Brick had brought an action
against Builder for conversion, how ought
you to advise Brick as to his liability to
Walker?

7.
Unlucky Owner owned a large diamond ring, set in an un.:.
usual mounting, which had been bequeathed to him by his Godfather.
While attending an ice hockey game at the local civic center. Unlucky Owner lost the ring. It was found by Lucky Finder who sold
it the next day to Tve Take Anything Pa\r.tn. Shop. Pawn Shop immediately displayed the ring with other,expensive jewelry which
it offered for sale to the public. Happy Consumer, in good faith
and without any knowledge of its having been lost, purchased the
diamond ring from Pawn Shop. Three months later while Unlucky
Owner was riding in a bus he observed the ring on the finger of
Happy Consumer. After Eappy Consumer refused to hand over the
ring when Unlucky owner demanded it, Unlucky consults you and asks:
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(a)

~-Jhat

form of proceedin0 shoult\ he institute
in an attei,tpt to recover the rin~J; and

(b) ~Jhether he would be successful if :Iappy

Consumer defended the case.
Under these facts, how ought you to advise
Unlucky Owner?
8.
i:Ierbert !'2i tchell brought an action against John Hankins
in the CArcuit Court of Alber::i'arle County to recover damages for an
allegedq,y_slanderous statement made by Hankinso In his motion for
judgment, among other allegations, ?1itchell recited:
"3o On the evening of ;1ay 14, 1974 the
defendant Hankins, knowing full well his statement was false, and only for the purpose of
damaging the plaintiff ili tchell, wrongfully
and maliciously stated to Tom Bent and -~'Jilliam
Clark, ~You should never have anything to do
with :Jerbert Uitchell. He is not to be trusted.
He has defrauded me by selling me an oil painting which he said was a valuable antique, but
which he knew was absolutely worthless.'
11

4. The foregoing slanderous statement
made by the defendant has injured the reputation
of the plaintiff thus causing him .to, sustain
damage of $10,000."
In response to the motion for judgment, !-Iankins duly filed his
grounds of def E:mse in which he denied making the slanderous statement alleged by Hitchell.
On the morning of november 11,\ 1974 when the case was
set for trial, and shortly after the jury was oworn, Uitchell suffered a heart attack, and the Court continued the case over generally. Mitchell never recovered from the attack, and died on
December 18th. Upon hearing of 11itchell's death, the Court called
upon counsel in the case to prepare and file a stipulation substantiating ;_'litchellas death. such a stipulation was prepared and
executed by counsel for Uitchell and Hankins, and was duly filed
in the Clerk's Office on January 9, 1975. The next day, the Court
wrote the following letter to counsel:
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"January 10, 1975
Re: Mitchell v. Hankins
11

To Counsel for both Parties:

I am of the opinion that this case presents
C\no actionable controversy before this Court.
'·/The ref ore, and on my motion, I will direct that
this action be dismissed and stricken from the
docket. Counsel for the defendant may prepare
and present for entry an appropriate order effecting this decision.

/s/

John Abernathy, Judge
Circuit Court of Albemarle County

ii

Upon receiving this cor:ununication from the Court, counsel for the
decedent Hitchell filed the following written objections to the
decision: (a) that the Court erred in its finding that there ·was
no actionable controversy before it, and (b) that the Court was
without authority to dismiss the action on its own motion and
without consent of all parties.
~"Jere

either, or both, of these objections well taken?

9.
On February 6, 1975, Skylark obtained a judgment against
Downbeat in the Circuit Court of Giles County for $7,000. Shortly
thereafter Skylark obtained a writ of fieri facias from the Clerk
of the Circuit Court of Giles County, retµrnable to the first day
of the Ilarch term of the Circuit Court which will begin on r1arch 4,
1975. Doi-mbeat owned a two-acre tract of land on Helf Creek, in
Giles County, upon which was located an unfurnished summer cottage.
He also kept an old pleasure horse of little value on the property.
Skylark learned that Downbeat also owned a stable of very valuable
show horses which he kept on a farm in Bland County. Skylark requested the Sheriff of Giles County to levy upon all of the above
mentioned properties of Downbeat and to sell them in order to satisfy his judgment.
(a)

r·Jhich of the properties, if any, are subject
to levy and sale by the Sheriff?

(b)

If any of the properties are subject to levy
and sale, when must the levy be made? t1hen
must the sale be made?
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10.
Winnie Winsome filed a bill of complaint against her
husband, Robert, in the Circuit Court of Campbell County, alleging that he had committed adultery on numerous occasions between
September l and Decerilier 1, 1974, and prayed for a divorce a
vinculo ~atrimonii. Robert filed an answer in which he asserted
the defepS-e of recrimination alleging that Winnie, during the
period Jtine to September 1, 1974, had been guilty of cruelty and
constructive desertion. On a hearing ore tenus, the Court found
that the evidence was sufficient to support Hinnie's charge of
adultery but also found that the evidence was sufficient to susta~n Robert's charge of cruelty and constructive desertion.
"'1. ro
What relief, if any, should the Court grant t.VV' 0!I .u ·
to the parties, or either of them?

J . .'

